UNDP produces a Capacity Assessment (CA) from which they work out the development plan. This, in it self, is a vast improvement from the previous top-down planning under the assumption that successful reforms were universally applicable. The CA "focuses on the current and desired levels of capacity in a given system or institution, the gap between them, and most important, the resulting capacity development strategies and actions – how the improvements will occur and how much such will cost to undertake."
First, the CA must Assess & Analyze, it is "a tool, not a solution. It requires a prior understanding of the political context within which capacity is deployed and a clear rationale for why certain capacities are desired in the future." Quite obviously the CA depends on local understanding of the politics, institutions, and societal capacity as well as the feedback from these particular communities. In fact, it seems to be the very grounds on which everything else depends and yet the lack of feedback is one of the most critical flaws in today's interventions.
Second, the CA must Formulate Policy & Strategy, it is "a tool for understanding the current state of capacities and defining capacity gaps, capacity assessments provide valuable input into policy and strategy formulation work at the level of MDG-based development strategies and poverty reduction strategies. It also provides a basis for defining the UN's role to support capacity development, within these national processes."
The CA, and the UNDP at large, is inevitably connected to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These lofty goals lack individual accountability. They lack independent agencies with the authority to hold agents responsible for the efforts and outcomes of particular interventions. Collective responsibility for goals doesn't work for the same reason that collective ownership of farmland in China didn't work. Xiaogang 1978 - individual farming - 1982 Communist reform - 1984 there were no communes left. "tragedy of the commons." Collective Responsibility for many goals draws from the weight of pride in doing a good job. It weakens the incentive to complete/achieve particular objectives/projects.
The principal analyzes local capacity but aims to achieve global utopian goals. This strange organization persists because the poor are not the real customer -- rich-country politicians and voters are. Just think about how aid agencies advertise their effort… They emphasize input - the pool of money donated - not the outcome - the result of particular interventions. Politicians and aid bureaucrats react passively to dramatic headlines, utopian ideals, and ambitious global-objectives rather than according to where the scarce aid budget will benefit the most people. We must reward agents for reaching goals, not setting them.
Third, UNDP's ability to Manage & Implement Programmes & Services, depends heavily on their CA as well as their understanding of local norms. However, the poor quality of this information and the lack of feedback resides at the center of ineffective interventions. The systemic way of gathering critical knowledge and information is flawed. When the formulation of development strategy is contemplated, the aim is set for utopian and universal goals. They depend on collective responsibility and can therefore be discredited as flawed as well.
The CA states that "capacity resides on different levels -- systemic, institutional and individual." Assessments "at the individual level are carried out through performance management systems and are the responsibility of the countries concerned… [It] focuses on the systemic and institutional levels." The troubled and underdeveloped countries are held responsible for the capacity at an 'individual level.' The consumers, voters, teachers, mothers and other workers who man local institutions and live in accordance with a particular social system are dismissed.
Ironically, the CA also states that "it is important to note that 'these layers of capacity are interdependent. If one or the other is pursued on its own, development becomes skewed and inefficient.'" No wonder many of the programmes and service interventions are either unsuccessful or straight up harmful to the local community. We must value the human resources/capacity/capital much greater than this.
William Easterly, a former employee at the World Bank and now a professor at NYU admits in his book The White Man's Burden: "what we shock therapists didn't realize was that all reforms are partial; it is impossible to do everything at once, and no policy-maker has enough information even to know what 'everything' is… the "unintended consequences" problem is greater with a large-scale reform than with a smaller one… The overambitious reforms of shock therapy and structural adjustment were the flight of Icarus for the World Band and the IMF. Aiming for the sun, they instead descended into a sea of failure." He convincingly argues that despite "their recorded failure, the World Bank and IMF are still doing these loans; they have just changed their name to 'poverty reduction loans.' This is the fixation-on-a-big-goal characteristic of Planners, despite repeated failures to reach the goal."
Fourth, the capacity to Monitor and Evaluate. The monitoring of development, outcomes, and urgent necessities is just as critical, but, unfortunately just as invisible as the feedback from poor people at the bottom. Interventions do not work if the principal cannot observe performance by the agent. With no ability by the principal to monitor the agent, the agent has no incentive to work hard for the interests held by the principal.
It is possible to connect monitoring, feedback, and the lack of accountability as one big problem. Rich-countries mandate vague goals and are not held accountable for efforts or outcomes, therefore, the incentive for good performance cannot be strong. The evaluation that has taken place is often self-evaluation or the evaluation of co-workers. We must emphasize independent evaluation.
It's a mess. It's politically apolitical. Intervening with governments to impose good behavior, yet insisting that the government choose to behave. There's an unresolvable contradiction between conditions and sovereignty. There's also 'tied aid' which forces recipients to trade with the donor country. We must practice what we preach - free market. Aid is too important to be handled by politicians. We must adopt new methods and help the poor with piecemeal projects that benefit the human capacity. We must employ education as 'the point of entry.'
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